The Extended Republic as an Anti-Faction Design

Federalist Papers

This thread develops the extended republic from a response to faction into a broader theory of how political diversity can protect republican liberty.

increasing

Bearing strength in each event

decreasing

The Ancient Problem The Ancient Problem from "Federalist Papers". The Ancient Problem Republics in turmoil Hamilton recalls the instability and sudden changes associated with small republics.

The Ancient Problem from "Federalist Papers". The Ancient Problem Republics in turmoil Hamilton recalls the instability and sudden changes associated with small republics.

The Ancient Problem Republics in turmoil Hamilton recalls the instability and sudden changes associated with small republics. Their divisions, he argues, have supplied critics of republican liberty with a powerful case against self-government. Political invention Modern institutions such as representation and divided powers may reduce those dangers. Hamilton adds the enlargement of the republic as another means of preserving popular government.

The Anatomy of Faction The Anatomy of Faction from "Federalist Papers". The Anatomy of Faction Social differences endure Madison traces faction to differences in opinion, passion, and property.

The Anatomy of Faction from "Federalist Papers". The Anatomy of Faction Social differences endure Madison traces faction to differences in opinion, passion, and property.

The Anatomy of Faction Social differences endure Madison traces faction to differences in opinion, passion, and property. Attempts to erase those differences would require abolishing liberty or imposing uniformity. Effects can be managed Since causes cannot be removed, government must control faction’s effects. Madison makes this distinction the intellectual pivot of his argument for a larger representative republic.

Representation Refines Choice

Representation Refines Choice Deliberation through agents Madison argues that elected representatives may refine public views and pursue the common good. Their broader responsibilities can make them less captive to immediate local pressures. Representation can fail Representatives may also betray the people through intrigue or corruption. The design depends on elections and the widened field of candidates to improve the likelihood of sound judgment.

The Sphere Enlarged The Sphere Enlarged from "Federalist Papers". The Sphere Enlarged More interests included A larger territory contains a greater variety of parties and interests.

The Sphere Enlarged from "Federalist Papers". The Sphere Enlarged More interests included A larger territory contains a greater variety of parties and interests.

The Sphere Enlarged More interests included A larger territory contains a greater variety of parties and interests. Madison argues that this diversity makes it harder for a majority faction to recognize and coordinate its collective strength. A practical limit The republic must remain within a workable sphere for representatives to meet and govern. Madison answers the objection from distance by pointing to existing communication and the continuing role of State governments.

A Republican Remedy A Republican Remedy from "Federalist Papers". A Republican Remedy Interests check interests Madison connects a multiplicity of social interests to the constitutional division of authority.

A Republican Remedy from "Federalist Papers". A Republican Remedy Interests check interests Madison connects a multiplicity of social interests to the constitutional division of authority.

A Republican Remedy Interests check interests Madison connects a multiplicity of social interests to the constitutional division of authority. The federal structure creates more barriers against a majority’s attempt to oppress a minority. Liberty through design The extended republic does not depend on the disappearance of conflict or the perfection of citizens. It seeks to make justice and the general good more likely outcomes of a diverse political society.

Federalist No. 9, November 21, 1787

Federalist No. 10, November 22, 1787

Federalist Nos. 10 and 14, November 22–30, 1787

Federalist No. 51, February 6, 1788